Historical overview
What it was. Zulfiqar was a family of Iranian main battle tanks developed after the Iran-Iraq War to reduce dependence on foreign armored-vehicle supply chains. The family is commonly described as drawing on the automotive experience of the U.S.-origin M48/M60 series and on T-72-family armament and production know-how, but with a distinctive welded hull and turret rather than a simple copy of either source vehicle. [Army Guide; Forecast International; GlobalSecurity; U.S. Army ODIN] Sources
Why it mattered. For Iran, Zulfiqar represented a strategic industrial milestone: a domestically assembled or produced MBT line at a time when Iran’s armored fleet depended on aging pre-revolution U.S. tanks, captured or imported Soviet designs, Chinese and North Korean supply channels, and locally rebuilt vehicles. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency described Iran’s ground forces as operating a mixed inventory of older U.S. and Soviet/Russian systems while emphasizing Iran’s preference to produce weapons domestically where possible. [DIA 2019; Forecast International 2024] Sources
Historical significance. Zulfiqar did not reset global tank design and is not established as a peer of late-model M1A2, Leopard 2A6/2A7, Leclerc XLR, T-90M, or K2-standard vehicles. Its significance is instead national and industrial: it helped Iran demonstrate domestic tank design, systems integration, heavy-vehicle manufacturing, and upgrade experience. The family also forms a bridge in open-source narratives between older Iranian rebuild programs such as T-72Z/Safīr-74, M60/Samsam/Sabalan, and later publicized vehicles such as Karrar. Sources
Most important variants. Published accounts describe three principal Zulfiqar variants: Zulfiqar-1 as the early limited-production vehicle; Zulfiqar-2 as a prototype or development bridge; and Zulfiqar-3 as a later enlarged or improved model. A separate Zulfiqar-3 account is also retained in the available accounts. External sources broadly support this three-step narrative but disagree on dates, production status, and specifications. [Army Guide; Army Recognition; Forecast International] Sources
Major controversies and myths. The largest unresolved issues are production quantity, exact armament of the first prototypes, powerpack identity, armor composition, fire-control sophistication, and whether Zulfiqar-3 is described as a fielded production standard or a limited parade/developmental type. Published production estimates range from claims of only a handful of early test vehicles to much larger open-published estimates. Published accounts describe official-looking figures, defense-industry claims, and commercial intelligence estimates as separate evidentiary categories rather than merging them into a single “known” total. Sources
Zulfiqar is best understood as an Iranian industrial and sustainment program with limited combat documentation, uncertain production quantities, and probable reliance on foreign-derived subsystems. The program shows how Iran tried to move from repair, rebuild, and license-production work toward indigenous armored-vehicle development under political isolation and sanctions. Sources
: U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran Military Power: Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance, 2019. Used for Iranian ground forces context, DIO role, and domestic-production strategy. [DIA 2019] Sources
: Forecast International archived Zulfiqar report, February 2024. Used for technical-data caveats, development narrative, and explicitly marked production estimates. [FI 2024] Sources
: Army Guide: Zulfiqar entry. Used for manufacturer, layout, suspension, production-date claims, and Iranian-source specification claims. [Army Guide] Sources
: U.S. Army OE Data Integration Network / Worldwide Equipment Guide: Zulfiqar-1 Iranian Main Battle Tank, updated 2024. Used as an official U.S. Army equipment-reference lead. [ODIN 2024] Sources
: Army Recognition: Zulfiqar 3 main battle tank, updated December 2025. Used only as a secondary, current open-source summary for Zulfiqar-3 claims. [Army Recognition 2025] Sources
: GlobalSecurity: Zulfiqar main battle tank, updated October 2024. Used for supplementary development and prototype chronology, with caution. [GlobalSecurity 2024] Sources
Strategic context. Iran entered the post-1988 period with one of the region’s most varied armored fleets. The 1979 revolution had severed the Shah-era supply relationship with Western producers, while the Iran-Iraq War imposed heavy attrition and forced Iran to improvise repair, cannibalization, import, captured-equipment use, and local rebuild programs. The surviving inventory included U.S.-origin M47, M48, and M60 tanks; British Chieftains; Soviet T-54/T-55/T-62/T-72 types; and Chinese Type 59/69-series vehicles. [FI 2024; CSIS/Cordesman and Kleiber; DIA 2019] Sources
Military problem. The core problem was sustainment as much as tactical performance. Iran needed tanks it could repair, upgrade, and ultimately produce despite sanctions and arms-supply vulnerability. A purely imported modern-tank solution was politically and practically fragile. A domestic MBT program promised self-reliance, a national prestige symbol, a training ground for Iranian defense engineers, and a partial answer to aging armored forces. Sources
Doctrine and battlefield lessons. The Iran-Iraq War showed the value and limitations of tanks in large-scale conventional war under air threat, artillery saturation, mines, anti-tank missiles, and logistics stress. Iranian armored units had to fight with mixed equipment and uneven support. A domestic family that borrowed familiar automotive and armament components could fit existing training and maintenance realities better than a wholly new imported system. Sources
Industrial constraints. Iran’s defense industry could rebuild and modernize older tanks, manufacture some components, and integrate foreign-derived subsystems. It could not easily access the full suite of high-end late-Cold-War Western thermal sights, powerpacks, composite armor technologies, ammunition, or fire-control systems. The U.S. DIA report notes that Iran’s Defense Industries Organization fields tanks and armored vehicles, while also stressing that Iran continued to seek advanced systems it could not yet produce at top-tier standards. [DIA 2019] Sources
Political and procurement context. The Zulfiqar program fits Iran’s broader pattern of strategic autonomy: public announcements, parade appearances, and state-media coverage often emphasized indigenous capability. Such messaging makes the vehicle useful for deterrence and regime legitimacy, but it also complicates research because publicity claims do not always distinguish prototypes, limited production, field trials, and operational deployment. Sources
Development and variants
Many public sources instead begin the design story with 1993 prototypes or a 1994 unveiling; those dates are preserved in the chronology and development section. [FI 2024; Army Guide; GlobalSecurity; Armytechnology] Sources
Classification. Zulfiqar is classified here as a main battle tank family. It is not an armored personnel carrier, infantry fighting vehicle, tank destroyer, or self-propelled gun. The classification issue is not its type but its program status: open sources disagree over whether individual variants were operational, experimental, parade vehicles, limited-production vehicles, or part of a larger serial-production program. Sources
Included. Included are the original Zulfiqar / Zulfiqar-1, reported Zulfiqar-2 development vehicles, Zulfiqar-3 and its prototype or upgraded model, Iranian service and production context, and closely related Iranian upgrade programs when needed to explain boundaries. Sources
Excluded but discussed. Karrar, Tiam, Sabalan, Samsam, and T-72Z/Safīr-74 are not treated as Zulfiqar variants in the cited record. Sources
Origin. Open-source accounts usually place the beginning of the Zulfiqar design effort in the early 1990s. Forecast International reports that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps established a requirement for a new indigenous tank around 1990. Armytechnology and other secondary sources report that a first indigenous prototype was designed around 1993 and revealed in 1994. Army Guide states that Iran unveiled a new MBT called Zulfiqar in early 1994 and connects the program to the Construction Crusade, an arm of the IRGC. [FI 2024; Army Guide; Armytechnology; GlobalSecurity] Sources
Organizations and industry. Sources associate Zulfiqar with Iran’s Ministry of Defense, the Defense Industries Organization, the IRGC-linked development ecosystem, and the Shahid Kolah Dooz Industrial Complex. Army Guide identifies Shahid Kolah Dooz Industrial Complex as the manufacturer. Forecast International identifies the Iranian Defense Industries Organization as prime contractor and the Iranian Ministry of Defense through the IRGC as sponsor. [Army Guide; FI 2024; DIA 2019] Sources
Prototype timeline. The most common chronology is: requirement or early program definition around 1990; early prototype design in 1993; public unveiling in 1994; initial or pre-production claims in 1995-1996; and six semi-industrial prototypes or test vehicles in 1997. Some sources state that series production began in 1997; others imply earlier production-line launch or only limited assembly. Published accounts describe the 1996-1997 period as the best-supported transition from prototype publicity to limited production or pre-series work, not as proof of large-scale output. [Army Guide; GlobalSecurity; Armytechnology; Mehr News; FI 2024] Sources
Design evolution. Zulfiqar-1 appears to have been the early baseline vehicle with a welded, box-like hull and turret, M48/M60-like suspension features, and a main gun usually described as 125 mm on production or later examples. Forecast International notes that the initial prototype may have used a 105 mm L7/M68-family gun while subsequent models used a 125 mm 2A46-family smoothbore; other sources present the 125 mm weapon more uniformly. Zulfiqar-2 is usually described as a development bridge. Zulfiqar-3 is described as longer, wider, and more extensively modified, with seven roadwheels in some public descriptions rather than the six-roadwheel layout associated with earlier vehicles. [FI 2024; Army Guide; Army Recognition 2025] Sources
Formal Iranian trial reports and serial-production records are not publicly documented in detail in the cited sources. Much of the evidence consists of parade photographs, exhibition reports, state media, and commercial intelligence summaries. Forecast International cautions that technical data are fragmentary and contradictory, leaving many precise specifications uncertain. [FI 2024] Sources
Cancellations and redesigns. No reliable public source documents a clean cancellation of Zulfiqar. Instead, the program appears to have moved through overlapping prototype, low-rate production, modernization, and publicity phases while Iran pursued other armored programs. Later vehicles such as Karrar may represent either a parallel T-72-derived path or a more important modern-production focus than Zulfiqar itself, but the available sources do not establish a simple replacement sequence. Sources
Design and performance
Zulfiqar follows the conventional MBT layout: driver in the front hull, fighting compartment and turret in the center, and engine/transmission at the rear. Several sources describe the driver as offset to one side and the commander and gunner as occupying turret positions around the main armament. Crew count is usually given as three if the 125 mm gun is fed by an autoloader, but some project records preserve a 3-4 crew range because early armament and loading arrangements are not fully resolved. [Army Guide; FI 2024] Sources
The hull is generally described as welded steel rather than a direct T-72 hull copy. Army Guide emphasizes that the hull is boxier than a T-72 hull and that the suspension/roadwheel family looks closer to M48/M60 influence. Forecast International similarly describes a conventional hull with rear powerpack and M48/M60-like automotive cues. The hull shape is one of the strongest visual arguments that Zulfiqar is a local hybrid design rather than a rebadged imported tank. [Army Guide; FI 2024] Sources
The turret is usually described as welded, flat-sided, rectangular, or box-like, with sloped frontal surfaces on earlier vehicles. That turret gives Zulfiqar a visual identity unlike the cast M60 turret and unlike the low rounded T-72 turret. Public images and descriptions suggest variations in cupolas, stowage baskets, smoke launchers, and later applique or add-on armor. Precise internal arrangement is not reliably published. [Army Guide; FI 2024; Wikimedia images] Sources
The baseline armor is generally described as welded steel alloy, with later sources claiming applique, composite, laminated, ceramic, or explosive reactive armor on improved vehicles, especially Zulfiqar-3. These claims are plausible in broad terms but not quantified in reliable thickness or protection-equivalence figures. Sources
Most sources describe production Zulfiqar-family vehicles as armed with a 125 mm smoothbore gun related to the Soviet/Russian 2A46 family and fed by an autoloader. Forecast International preserves a significant caveat: an initial prototype may have used a 105 mm L7/M68-family gun before later 125 mm vehicles. The cited accounts reflects the same uncertainty by listing Zulfiqar-1 armament as “125 mm or 105 mm depending source”. [FI 2024; Army Guide] Sources
Reported secondary weapons include a 7.62 mm coaxial or roof-mounted machine gun and a 12.7 mm anti-aircraft/heavy machine gun, often identified as MG3 or DShK/M2HB-family weapons depending on source and vehicle. External photographs show roof-mounted weapons and smoke grenade launchers on some examples, but exact standardization by variant is unclear. [Army Guide; FI 2024; Army Recognition 2025] Sources
For 125 mm-equipped vehicles, published secondary sources list HE-FRAG, APFSDS, HEAT, and sometimes gun-launched anti-tank guided missile capability. The guided-missile claim remains uncertain because it may reflect theoretical compatibility with 2A46-family systems rather than confirmed Iranian service ammunition and fire-control integration. Reliable ammunition stowage capacity is not publicly established. [Army Recognition 2025; FI 2024] Sources
Iranian-source claims and secondary summaries describe computerized fire control, laser rangefinder, stabilized sights, and night-vision systems. Forecast International suggests a T-72-derived or mixed-component fire-control basis with foreign components, but also warns that technical data remain fragmentary. Some older video or observational accounts questioned whether early Zulfiqar vehicles demonstrated fully stabilized fire-on-the-move performance. Variant-specific fire-control claims remain uncertain. [Army Guide; FI 2024] Sources
Available public sources mention day/night sighting, passive night-vision or image-intensifier systems, and laser ranging. Modern thermal-imaging capability is not confirmed at a standard comparable to late-model Western MBTs. The lack of open technical manuals, procurement records, or detailed interior imagery prevents reliable conclusions about optics fit across Zulfiqar-1, -2, and -3. [FI 2024; Army Recognition 2025] Sources
Engine identity is disputed. Some Iranian-source-derived specifications state 1,000 hp and 70 km/h or higher speeds. Forecast International is more cautious, noting that rear-deck and exhaust features resemble M48/M60 practice and that an AVDS-1790-type 750-800 hp diesel would yield roughly 17-18 hp/t if used. ODIN search summaries list 780 hp for Zulfiqar-1. Published accounts describe the range rather than selecting one as definitive. [Army Guide; FI 2024; ODIN 2024] Sources
Early Zulfiqar vehicles are typically described with torsion-bar suspension, six dual roadwheels per side, rear drive sprocket, front idler, and return rollers, visually closer to M48/M60-series practice than to T-72. Some later Zulfiqar-3 descriptions state seven roadwheels per side, consistent with a longer or redesigned chassis. The distinction is important for identifying images. [Army Guide; FI 2024; Army Recognition 2025] Sources
Published speeds vary from about 60 km/h to 70-75 km/h depending on source and variant. Range is often given as approximately 450 km for later Zulfiqar-3 summaries, while early Zulfiqar-1 range is less consistently published. Mobility claims are difficult to verify because no reliable comparative trials or operational reports are public. [IranPress; Army Guide; Army Recognition 2025] Sources
A three-person crew is plausible for a 125 mm autoloaded production vehicle, with driver, commander, and gunner. If early prototype vehicles used a 105 mm manually loaded arrangement, a four-person crew would be possible, explaining the published account’s 3-4 crew caution. No reliable public interior plan supports a precise ergonomic evaluation. [FI 2024] Sources
Radio and battle-management details are not reliably published. Iranian armored units likely used a mix of domestic, Russian-derived, and upgraded communications equipment across the fleet, but Zulfiqar-specific secure-radio, datalink, or battle-management claims cannot be repeated without better evidence. Sources
Smoke grenade launchers are visible or reported on several variants. Later public claims mention NBC protection, laser-warning receivers, explosive reactive armor, or active-protection-related experimentation, but details remain fragmentary. No reliable source proves that all Zulfiqar-family vehicles received a modern hard-kill active protection system. Sources
No public reliability record equivalent to a military trial report is available. A hybrid design drawing on familiar M60 automotive concepts and T-72 armament could simplify some maintenance tasks for Iran’s existing repair base, but mixing subsystems can also create integration and parts-standardization problems. The safest assessment is that Zulfiqar was maintainable within Iran’s domestic ecosystem but not documented as exceptionally reliable. Sources
Likely weaknesses include obsolete or uncertain optics compared with top-tier contemporaries, unclear armor protection, limited production scale, uncertain ammunition quality, and weak public evidence of combat employment. The vehicle’s heavy reliance on public demonstrations rather than transparent procurement data also makes its real operational value difficult to quantify. Sources
Production, operators, and combat record
Manufacturers and facilities. Public sources associate Zulfiqar with Iran’s Defense Industries Organization and the Shahid Kolah Dooz Industrial Complex. The program was sponsored within Iran’s defense establishment and is frequently tied to IRGC-linked development and postwar self-sufficiency initiatives. The exact division of design, assembly, subcontracting, and rebuild work is not public. [FI 2024; Army Guide; DIA 2019] Sources
Production timeline. Claims cluster around 1995-1997 for initial production or semi-industrial prototype work. Army Guide states that production commenced in 1997, with the possibility of pre-production in 1996. GlobalSecurity and Armytechnology summaries cite six prototypes produced and tested around 1997. Iranian media has also referred to production-line launch at the Kolahdooz facility in summer 1997. Because these claims may describe prototypes, pre-series vehicles, or limited production rather than full-rate manufacture, Published accounts describe “1996-1997” as a transition period rather than a precise mass-production start. [Army Guide; GlobalSecurity; Armytechnology; Mehr News] Sources
Production bottlenecks. Likely bottlenecks included powerpack production, fire-control and optics integration, quality-controlled armor fabrication, gun/ammunition production, autoloader integration, and standardization across Iran’s mixed armored fleet. Iran had access to T-72 systems and domestic rebuild experience, but advanced sights, engines, and modern armor packages were difficult to produce at leading-edge standards under sanctions. Sources
Cost. No official unit cost is available. Forecast International provides a 2024 price estimate, but that number is a commercial forecast estimate, not a disclosed Iranian contract figure, so it cannot serve as a definitive unit price. [FI 2024] Sources
Export and licensed production. There is no reliable evidence of export production or licensed foreign manufacture. Forecast International and Army Guide both present Iran as the only user, and no confirmed operator outside Iran appears in the available accounts. [FI 2024; Army Guide] Sources
Zulfiqar production totals are disputed. Some accounts describe only prototypes or small early batches, while Forecast International estimates a much larger cumulative number through 2023. Public contract records, serial blocks, and independent fleet counts do not establish one authoritative total. Sources
Original operator. Iran is the only confirmed operator. The vehicle is associated with the Iranian Army ground forces and, in some program-origin descriptions, the IRGC development and procurement ecosystem. Whether all fielded examples belong to the regular Army, the IRGC Ground Force, training establishments, or mixed parade/trial units is not publicly resolved. [DIA 2019; FI 2024] Sources
Postwar service and current status. Zulfiqar remains visible in Iranian armored-vehicle narratives and parade imagery, including 21st-century public appearances. However, the vehicle’s actual frontline readiness, numbers in service, and modernization status are uncertain. Sources
First combat use. No reliable public source confirms a specific first combat use of Zulfiqar. The family is best documented in development, parade, training, and open-source recognition contexts rather than in battle records. Sources
Major campaigns and battles. No campaign can be confidently attached to Zulfiqar as an operational combat participant. Iranian armored forces have been relevant to regional deterrence and internal defense planning, but Zulfiqar-specific combat claims is described as unconfirmed unless supported by unit records, imagery geolocation, or credible battle reporting. Sources
Tactical employment. If fielded, Zulfiqar would likely fill standard MBT roles in Iranian armored and mechanized formations: direct fire, counterattack, defense of key terrain, and deterrent presence. Its mixed-technology nature suggests it would be more useful in Iranian sustainment and training ecosystems than as an expeditionary high-end tank. Sources
Strengths and weaknesses in combat. Likely strengths would include domestic maintainability, familiarity with existing Iranian tank subsystems, 125 mm armament on later vehicles, and national control of upgrades. Weaknesses would include uncertain optics, uncertain armor, limited production standardization, and unknown reliability under combat stress. Sources
Losses and survivability. No reliable loss database or survivability dataset exists for Zulfiqar. The cited evidence does not establish battlefield loss rates, kill ratios, or combat durability. Sources
Myths versus documented evidence. The main myth risk is treating parade descriptions as proof of mass-production or top-tier technical capability. Documented evidence supports an Iranian indigenous MBT program and visible vehicles; it does not support confident claims about exact fleet size, modern armor equivalence, or proven combat performance. Sources
Legacy and historical evidence
Influence on later tank design. Zulfiqar’s clearest influence is institutional rather than technical: it helped build experience in hull and turret fabrication, integration of foreign-derived armament, public presentation of domestic armored capability, and the transition from repair/rebuild work to design claims. Later Iranian vehicles such as Karrar occupy the more modern publicity space, but Zulfiqar remains a key predecessor in Iran’s domestic MBT narrative. Sources
Doctrinal impact. There is no evidence that Zulfiqar transformed Iranian armored doctrine. Its doctrinal importance lies in supporting a mixed armored force under sanctions, not in introducing a revolutionary new tactical concept. Sources
Postwar developments. Publicly reported variants and upgrades suggest continuing modification of Iranian armored vehicles. Zulfiqar-3’s publicity, alleged improved armor and FCS, and parade appearances indicate that Iran continued to use the family as a showcase for domestic progress even when newer projects drew attention. Sources
Surviving vehicles and museum examples. Open photographic records show preserved or displayed/paraded Zulfiqar vehicles, but a systematic museum-survivor register was not found. Sources
Modern reputation. Zulfiqar is often treated in popular summaries as either a homemade copy or an indigenous breakthrough. Both descriptions are too simplistic. It is better described as a hybrid national program whose details remain opaque and whose importance is strongest in industrial-history terms. Sources
Common misconceptions. The most common misconceptions are that Zulfiqar was a simple T-72 copy, that every publicized vehicle was in full operational service, and that published top-line specifications are confirmed factory data. The evidence supports none of those claims with well-documented. Sources
The source base is uneven. U.S. government sources provide strong context on Iran’s ground forces and defense industry but limited Zulfiqar-specific engineering detail. Commercial and recognition sources provide more technical detail but frequently contradict each other. Iranian media provides valuable date and naming clues but can blend operational reality with strategic messaging. Sources
Zulfiqar is an Iranian MBT family publicly associated with domestic development in the 1990s. Sources
Iran is the only confirmed operator in the cited accounts. Sources
The family is connected to Iran’s broader postwar push for domestic defense-industrial self-reliance. Sources
Zulfiqar-1 used a hybrid design lineage with M48/M60-like automotive cues and T-72-family armament influence. Sources
The mid-1990s were the key transition from prototype publicity to limited/pre-series production work. Sources
The family used or was intended to use a 125 mm smoothbore gun on later vehicles. Sources
Zulfiqar-3 represented an enlarged or improved vehicle compared with the earliest Zulfiqar forms. Sources
Exact production quantities for any variant. Sources
Exact armor composition or protection level. Sources
Exact engine model and horsepower for each variant. Sources
Ammunition stowage, gun-launched missile integration, and fire-control capability. Sources
Assignment to specific Iranian units and current readiness. Sources
Production totals. Published accounts describe low/unclear production. Some external sources cite six prototypes/test vehicles, while Forecast International estimates a much larger cumulative total through 2023. The cited evidence does not establish a definitive production or inventory total. Sources
Designations. Zulfiqar, Zolfaqar, and Zolfaghar are English transliterations of the same underlying name. Zulfiqar-1, -2, and -3 appear in open sources, but boundaries between prototype, modernization, and production standards remain uncertain. Sources
Service dates. Published accounts describe 1990s-present with “Active? / uncertain.” Published accounts describe that formulation and does not claim a precise in-service date or retirement status. Sources
Photographs and image credits
Background reading and references. Each photograph has its own source and credit.
Sources and further reading
Background reading and references. Each photograph has its own source and credit.
- U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency: Iran Military Power: Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance. 2019.
- U.S. Army ODIN / Worldwide Equipment Guide: “Zulfiqar-1 Iranian Main Battle Tank (MBT).” Updated 5 August 2024.
- Forecast International: “Zulfiqar,” Military Vehicles Forecast, archived report, February 2024.
- Army Guide: “Zulfiqar.”.
- GlobalSecurity.org: “Zulfiqar Main Battle Tank.”.
- Army Recognition: “Zulfiqar 3 Main Battle Tank.” Updated December 2025.
- Mehr News Agency: “Iran Army modern tanks; nightmare for aggressors,” 24 April 2013.
- Iran Press: “Iranian tank Zolfaghar, a permanent legacy.” 11 December 2022.
- Trackpads historical compilation, 2026 (unpublished).
- Anthony H. Cordesman and Martin Kleiber: Iran’s Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities: The Threat in the Northern Gulf. CSIS/Praeger, 2007.
- Wikimedia Commons: Zulfiqar tank side view: File: Zulfiqar Tank - Side View.JPG. Author: Professional Assassin. Date: 14 April 2009.
- Wikimedia Commons: Zulfiqar tank rear view: File: Zulfiqar Tank - Back View.JPG. Author: Professional Assassin. Date: 14 April 2009.
- Wikimedia Commons / Mehr News Agency: File: Islamic Republic of Iran Army Day, 2023, Tehran (068).jpg. Photographer: Ali Haddadi Asl / Mehr News Agency. Date: 18 April 2023.
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