Historical overview
The T-62 post-Cold-War modernized family is not a clean-sheet modern tank family. It is a long tail of rebuilds and battlefield adaptations applied to a Soviet design whose original importance was the combination of a low silhouette, a 115 mm U-5TS smoothbore gun, and mass producibility. The Tank Museum summarizes the baseline T-62 as the first production tank to use a smoothbore rather than a rifled main gun and notes that more than 20,000 were produced and supplied widely; specialist histories similarly emphasize the U-5TS and APFSDS ammunition as defining features of the design. [S1] [S2] Sources
Its post-Cold-War relevance comes from persistence. By the 1990s the T-62 was clearly behind newer Soviet/Russian T-64, T-72, T-80, and T-90 lines, but many hulls survived in storage and in export service. The Soviet T-62M and T-62MV packages had already added improved fire-control equipment, applique or explosive reactive armor, side skirts, engine improvements, and in T-62M form a gun-launched missile capability. These late-Cold-War packages became the baseline from which many post-1991 operators worked. [S2] [S3] Sources
The most important modern issue is Russia's 2022+ reactivation of T-62M and T-62MV stocks during the Russo-Ukrainian War. UK officials stated in March 2023 that roughly 800 antiquated T-62s had been taken from storage since summer 2022, while open-source loss projects caution that their lists count only visually confirmed losses and therefore understate real totals. Russian state-media sources and exhibition Published accounts describe upgraded sights, thermal imaging, additional armor, smoke launchers, slat armor, masts, and in some cases engine changes, but many batch details remain unverified and is not established as uniform across all vehicles. [S5] [S6] [S9] [S10] Sources
A modernized T-62 can still be useful as a direct-fire vehicle, training tank, security tank, emergency replacement, or mobile gun platform. It is much less credible as a peer main battle tank against contemporary ATGMs, top-attack munitions, drones, mines, thermal surveillance, and modern 120/125 mm fire-control systems. Its renewed service matters historically because it reveals the strategic value of stored armored inventories, the bottlenecks of tank repair industry, and the blurred line between modernization and battlefield improvisation. Sources
The original T-62 emerged from a Soviet requirement to improve the firepower of the T-55 generation without abandoning the compact, mass-producible, low-silhouette design culture of Soviet armored forces. Western M48, M60, Centurion, and early Chieftain developments pushed armor and firepower expectations upward. The Soviet answer was not to create a heavy, complex tank immediately, but to install a larger smoothbore gun in an evolved T-55-style platform and accept compromises in crew ergonomics, ammunition handling, and growth margin. [S1] [S2] Sources
The U-5TS/2A20 115 mm smoothbore gun gave the T-62 its claim to historical importance. Tank Encyclopedia describes the vehicle as introducing the smoothbore gun and APFSDS ammunition as standard armor-piercing equipment in a production tank, while The Tank Museum emphasizes its public appearance at the May 1965 Moscow parade and broad export distribution. [S1] [S2] Sources
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, the T-62 was no longer the center of Soviet tank development. The T-64, T-72, and T-80 had moved Soviet design toward 125 mm guns, autoloaders, composite armor, and stronger fire-control systems. The T-62 survived because it existed in large numbers, was familiar to crews and depots, and could be upgraded at lower cost than replacing every hull. This created the logic for T-62M and T-62MV: not to match the newest NATO or Soviet tanks one-for-one, but to keep a mass of older tanks tactically relevant for second-line, allied, reserve, or lower-intensity service. [S2] [S3] Sources
The post-Cold-War era changed the reason for keeping the T-62. Instead of serving mainly as an economical modernization of a still-common Soviet tank, it became an insurance policy: a stored hull that could be reactivated when modern inventories, industrial capacity, or political constraints made replacement difficult. The Russo-Ukrainian War made this logic visible to the public. Sources
Development and variants
Published accounts describe the item as a post-Cold-War upgrade and reactivation family built around the T-62M/T-62MV lineage, not as a account on the entire original T-62 family from first design to all Cold War exports. The baseline vehicle is summarized where necessary because the modern family cannot be understood without the U-5TS gun, four-man layout, manual loading, low silhouette, and T-55-derived Soviet industrial logic. [S1] [S2] Sources
Included: late-Soviet T-62M, T-62MV, T-62MD/Drozd as lineage; Russian post-1991 storage and reactivation; 2022+ T-62M/MV observed wartime standards; Syrian T-62M(V) transfers and service; Algerian T-62-based Berezhok fire-support conversions; support conversions where the cited accounts associates them with the T-62 chassis; and modern operator-retention issues. Sources
Excluded except as boundary notes: the DPRK Chonma-ho/Pokpung-ho/Songun/M2020 family, which is a separate North Korean development stream; the T-55AM/T-55MV family; the T-72 post-Soviet upgrade family; and paper-only missile-tank concepts. The IT-1 is mentioned because it used a T-62-related chassis and illustrates a classification boundary, but it was not a post-Cold-War T-62 modernization. Sources
Classification: The baseline T-62 straddled Soviet "medium tank" nomenclature and the Western MBT category. In modern usage the cited accounts identify the upgraded T-62M/MV family as a main battle tank upgrade/reactivation family, with several specialized derivatives. The Algerian Berezhok conversion is better described as a fire-support/infantry-support conversion than as a true MBT, because it substitutes an IFV-type 30 mm turret and guided missiles for the classic 115 mm tank-gun role. Sources
The baseline T-62 grew from the T-55/Object 165/166 lineage and entered Soviet production in the early 1960s. The design kept the conventional Soviet arrangement: driver forward, turret amidships, engine and transmission in the rear, four-man crew, manual loading, and compact turret architecture. It exchanged the T-55's 100 mm gun for the 115 mm U-5TS smoothbore, gaining anti-armor performance at the cost of ammunition size and loading ergonomics. [S1] [S2] Sources
The T-62M modernization was initiated in 1981 and entered service in 1983 according to Tank Encyclopedia's synthesis. The package included improved fire-control equipment, turret and hull applique protection often described as BDD or "brow" armor, side skirts, mine-protection improvements, engine changes, and 9K116-2 Sheksna gun-launched ATGM capability through the 115 mm gun. WeaponSystems.net stresses that T-62M was not a new-production vehicle but a retrofit to existing T-62s. [S2] [S3] Sources
The T-62MV followed as an ERA-equipped branch. Rather than using the full applique package in the same way, T-62MV variants are commonly associated with Kontakt explosive reactive armor on the turret and hull. The exact mix of applique, ERA, engines, sights, and subvariant suffixes varies by source and user, so variant tables represents family-level rather than as universal specifications. [S2] Sources
After the Soviet collapse, Russia and several successor/operator states retained T-62s in storage, training, internal-security, or secondary roles while newer vehicles received priority. Export operators continued to use T-62 and T-62M variants when spare parts, ammunition stocks, and doctrinal needs made them useful. Syria received Russian-supplied T-62M/T-62MV vehicles during the Syrian war according to Oryx reporting based on imagery; Algeria has been reported with T-62-based Berezhok fire-support conversions, a boundary case because the vehicle retains a T-62 hull but changes the weapon system and role. [S7] [S8] [S14] [S15] Sources
The 2022 invasion of Ukraine moved the T-62 from legacy footnote to strategic signal. UK officials reported in March 2023 that approximately 800 T-62s had been brought out of storage since summer 2022, tying the reactivation to Russia's losses of more modern armored vehicles. Russian state-media sources described 103rd Armored Repair Plant work in Atamanovka/Transbaikalia, including disassembly, replacement of units, control runs, and three-shift repair activity. [S5] [S9] [S10] Sources
Reported 2022+ features include thermal sights such as 1PN96MT-02 on some vehicles, additional Kontakt ERA or cage/slat protection, smoke grenade launchers, revised radios, and on exhibition vehicles an MGOES mast with visual/thermal/rangefinder channels. Russian state-media claims also mention deeper engine and mobility changes, but these is described as claims unless a vehicle-specific photographic or technical source confirms them. [S9] [S10] [S12] Sources
The term "T-62M obr. 2022" or "T-62MV obr. 2022" is useful as an observed shorthand, not as a rigorously standardized factory designation in all cases. Oryx recorded the first visually confirmed destruction of a T-62M obr. 2022 in March 2023 and a T-62MV obr. 2022 in May 2023, indicating that observers had begun distinguishing such configurations by visible equipment. [S6] Sources
Design and performance
The T-62 retains the classic Soviet rear-engine tank layout: driver in the hull front left, commander and gunner in the turret, loader on the right side of the gun, and engine/transmission in the rear. The four-man crew avoids an autoloader but demands a larger human-loader workload than later 125 mm Soviet tanks. The automatic cartridge-case ejection system was intended to reduce fumes and clutter, but it also introduced a distinctive loading cycle and could complicate high-rate firing. [S2] Sources
The hull is a welded steel structure derived from T-55 practice but lengthened and adapted for the larger turret ring and 115 mm weapon. Baseline protection is rolled homogeneous armor with heavy frontal emphasis; modern T-62M/MV protection relies heavily on applique armor, side skirts, Kontakt ERA, slat/cage structures, and improvised screens rather than on a new hull architecture. [S2] [S9] [S10] Sources
The cast turret is compact by Western standards but larger than the T-55's turret. T-62M vehicles can be recognized by distinctive turret applique "brows" on many examples, while T-62MV vehicles often show Kontakt ERA bricks across the turret face. Modern field vehicles add cage or overhead structures with highly variable geometry, especially in Ukraine, where anti-drone and top-attack protection became a constant tactical problem. [S3] [S10] [S16] Sources
Baseline armor was credible for its early-1960s generation but inadequate against modern long-rod kinetic rounds, tandem-warhead ATGMs, top-attack munitions, and drones. T-62M added passive applique packages and mine-protection improvements. T-62MV introduced ERA as the defining visible feature. Some T-62MD vehicles tested or fielded Drozd active protection, which is historically important but not a common post-2022 battlefield standard. Modern Russian examples have appeared with reactive armor, slat armor, roof cages, camouflage nets, and sometimes anti-drone or electronic-warfare equipment. No single package describes every reactivated tank. [S3] [S9] [S10] Sources
The main gun is the 115 mm U-5TS/2A20 smoothbore. It fires APFSDS, HEAT, and high-explosive/fragmentation ammunition; Tank Encyclopedia lists representative 115 mm ammunition types including 3BM-series APFSDS, 3BK-series HEAT, and 3OF-series HE-Frag rounds. T-62M added compatibility with the 9K116-2 Sheksna gun-launched missile system when the required sighting and guidance equipment is present. [S2] [S3] Sources
A key modernization question is whether some 2022+ sight replacements preserve or remove missile-guidance capability. A vehicle fitted with a thermal sight may still be far better for night target detection than an unmodernized tank, but if the 1K13 guidance channel is removed or disabled, the tank may lose a capability sometimes listed under the T-62M name. Published accounts describe missile capability on wartime reactivated tanks as vehicle-specific rather than universal unless confirmed by inspection. [S9] [S10] Sources
Secondary armament normally consists of a coaxial 7.62 mm machine gun, originally SGMT and later PKT in many sources, and a 12.7 mm DShK/DShKM roof machine gun on later vehicles. Tank Encyclopedia notes the DShKM requirement from 1969/1970-era vehicles and describes typical ammunition allocations for the PKT and DShKM. Modern vehicles may show additional machine-gun mounts, smoke dischargers, or field additions, but these are not standardized across the family. [S2] Sources
The large fixed 115 mm rounds are less ergonomic than 100 mm T-55 ammunition and constrain internal stowage. Baseline figures are often given around forty rounds, while upgraded vehicles with added equipment and missile capability may carry fewer depending on stowage and variant. Published accounts describe ammunition capacity figures as less certain unless tied to a specific technical manual because open sources often mix subvariants. Sources
Baseline T-62 fire control was simple by modern standards, built around stabilized gun laying and optical sights. T-62M's Volna package, laser rangefinding, ballistic improvements, and 9K116-2 missile channel were the defining late-Soviet improvements. Tank Encyclopedia identifies the Meteor family of two-plane stabilizers and notes later Meteor-M/M1 refits. [S2] Sources
2022+ modernization reports highlight thermal imaging, especially 1PN96MT-02 sightings, and exhibition vehicles with an MGOES mast carrying visual, thermal, and rangefinder channels. The best-supported claim is that some reactivated T-62s received new sights and observation gear; the least-supported claim is that all such tanks received a common deep-modernization package with new engine, full fire-control overhaul, and consistent protection. [S9] [S10] [S12] Sources
The baseline T-62 used a V-55-series diesel, with many sources listing 580 hp. WeaponSystems.net lists the T-62M with a V-55U V-12 diesel producing 620 hp, a manual transmission with five forward gears and one reverse gear, 45 km/h forward speed, 7 km/h reverse speed, and approximately 450 km road range or 650 km with external fuel. Tank Encyclopedia describes torsion-bar suspension, roadwheel layout, OMSh and RMSh track differences, and a weight increase to around 37 tonnes with RMSh tracks on some vehicles. [S3] [S2] Sources
Russian state-media modernization stories mention stronger engines, including figures around 690 hp or 780 hp depending on subvariant or claim. These remain uncertain. A repaired vehicle may have a replacement engine; an exhibition demonstrator may not represent mass refits; and field tanks may vary depending on the depot, stock condition, and available spares. [S9] [S10] Sources
The low Soviet silhouette came at an ergonomic cost. The loader works with long fixed ammunition in a confined turret. The commander's situational awareness is limited compared with modern panoramic-sight tanks. The driver benefits from a compact hull but suffers from older vision arrangements and escape constraints. In modern combat, the family's cramped layout and ammunition stowage exacerbate crew survivability concerns when the vehicle is penetrated. Sources
Original T-62 communications equipment was adequate for Soviet Cold War doctrine but outdated by modern standards. Post-2022 refits have been reported with replacement radios in some cases, but Historical evidence is lower than for visible ERA, cages, and sight changes. Communications modernization is operationally critical because a T-62 without modern navigation, secure radio, and drone-fed targeting is not equivalent to a modernized T-72 or T-90M even if it has a thermal sight. Sources
Strengths include simple diesel mechanics, a familiar Soviet automotive base, a large historical spare-parts ecosystem, and an absence of autoloader complexity. Weaknesses include limited armor growth, weaker reverse mobility, old ammunition handling, old wiring/electronics, lower crew situational awareness, and vulnerability to mines, ATGMs, artillery fragments, and drones. The strategic appeal of the T-62 is therefore not superiority; it is availability. Sources
Production, operators, and combat record
The original T-62 was a large Soviet industrial program; the post-Cold-War family is principally a repair, storage, and conversion story. Open sources commonly cite more than 20,000 or 22,000 T-62s produced depending on whether accounting includes all Soviet and foreign production and derivatives. That mass explains why the design could return decades later: a vehicle produced in great numbers creates spare hulls, spare engines, training memory, ammunition stocks, and depot procedures long after frontline status has passed. [S1] Sources
T-62M was explicitly a conversion of existing tanks, not new production. WeaponSystems.net notes that T-62M was fitted as an upgrade to existing T-62s; Tank Encyclopedia places the modernization decision in 1981 and entry into service in 1983. Post-1991 modernization depends on inherited Soviet hulls rather than on restarting a mature T-62 production line from scratch. [S2] [S3] Sources
Russia's 2022+ reactivation effort shifted attention to repair plants. Russian state-media reports identify the 103rd Armored Repair Plant in Atamanovka/Transbaikalia as a site where stored T-62s were disassembled, repaired, fitted with new components, and test-driven before return to service. The state-media reports identify industrial activity but do not independently verify every claimed performance improvement. [S9] [S10] Sources
Industrial bottlenecks probably included optics, thermal sights, engines, ERA blocks, radios, transport capacity, trained depot labor, and the condition of long-stored hulls. A stored T-62 is not automatically a combat-ready tank. It requires inspection for corrosion, engine condition, transmission condition, hydraulic and electrical systems, gun barrel condition, seals, optics, track condition, and ammunition compatibility. The difference between "taken from storage" and "fielded in an effective unit" is therefore one of the key unresolved questions. [S5] [S9] Sources
Export and local conversion programs show a second industrial path: use the T-62 hull as a carrier for a different weapon package. Algeria's reported Berezhok conversion is the clearest modern example. It suggests that some operators see the T-62 less as an MBT to be preserved and more as a rugged armored chassis that can be repurposed for direct infantry fire support. [S14] [S15] Sources
The T-62 served widely during the Cold War and persisted in post-Cold-War inventories because many operators had no immediate replacement, because ammunition and maintenance networks already existed, or because the vehicle could be relegated to reserve, training, border defense, or internal-security duties. Sources
Operator numbers are especially uncertain. Public IISS/Military Balance-style inventories are useful for comparative order-of-battle work, but the line between stored, reserve, training, cannibalized, captured, and operational vehicles are often blurred. For narrative work, the most defensible claims are vehicle-specific: a photographed T-62M in Syrian service, a visually documented loss in Ukraine, a museum survivor, or an official statement about storage reactivation. Sources
The baseline T-62 saw extensive Cold War combat, including Middle Eastern wars, Soviet service in Afghanistan, and numerous regional conflicts. Sources
Oryx documented Russian deliveries of T-62M tanks and BMP-1s to the Syrian Arab Army in 2017, intended for the 5th Corps, and later noted additional T-62M(V) deliveries in the broader pattern of replenishing Syrian armored stocks. Syria shows the export-reserve role: Russia could supply older but still functional armor to an ally where the threat environment, training system, and logistics made T-62M/MV more useful than no tank at all. [S7] [S8] Sources
Ukraine turned the T-62's modern reputation into a symbol. The reappearance of T-62M/MV tanks was widely interpreted as evidence of Russian armored losses, stockpile drawdown, and repair-industry pressure. The UK government's March 2023 OSCE statement explicitly framed the withdrawal of approximately 800 T-62s from storage as a response to heavy armored losses. [S5] Sources
On the battlefield, reactivated T-62s appear to have filled roles ranging from second-line defense and infantry fire support to assault support, supply carriers, and improvised protected vehicles. Reuters reported in June 2024 that Ukrainian forces captured a Russian modified T-62 "barn" tank near Klishchiivka, with a box-like anti-drone exterior and a role associated with moving supplies and personnel. That example illustrates a broader trend: older tanks are adapted into protected battlefield utility vehicles when drone and artillery threats make even rear-area movement dangerous. [S16] Sources
Oryx is useful but methodologically conservative. It states that its equipment-loss lists include only vehicles with photo or video evidence and therefore real losses are higher than documented totals. This makes Oryx strong for proving that a configuration existed and was lost, but weak for estimating total losses or total active inventory. [S6] Oryx's separate tracking of still-undestroyed types noted the first visually confirmed losses of T-62M obr. 2022 and T-62MV obr. 2022 in 2023. [S6] Sources
Strengths: availability, a still-dangerous 115 mm high-explosive and direct-fire capability, simple mechanics, manual loading, and lower training burden compared with some more complex systems. Weaknesses: obsolete protection, limited modern situational awareness unless upgraded, vulnerable roof and side arcs, weaker reverse speed, older ammunition, and difficulty surviving drones, mines, tandem ATGMs, artillery, and modern tank fire. Sources
Myth: Every T-62 in Ukraine is an unmodified 1960s tank. Evidence: many are T-62M/MV derivatives with applique armor, ERA, or new sights; however, the quality and completeness of refits varies. [S5] [S9] [S10] Sources
Myth: A thermal sight makes a T-62 equivalent to a modern MBT. Evidence: thermal imaging improves detection, but it does not solve armor, ammunition, mobility, crew-survivability, and networking limitations. Sources
Myth: Oryx loss counts equal total losses. Evidence: Oryx explicitly counts only visually documented losses. [S6] Sources
Myth: Russian state-media modernization descriptions apply to every reactivated T-62. Evidence: state-media and exhibition reports are useful leads, but field photographs show batch-by-batch variation. [S9] [S10] Sources
Legacy and historical evidence
Strategic impact: the modernized T-62's significance is not that it restored parity. The program illustrates how stored hulls and extensive repair can replenish part of a depleted fleet under artillery pressure and drone surveillance. The vehicle's return is a warning about industrial endurance rather than a sign of technological success. Sources
Historically, the T-62 is remembered for putting a smoothbore tank gun into mass service and for bridging the gap between T-55 simplicity and the more radical T-64/T-72/T-80 generation. Its modernized family adds a second legacy: the afterlife of Cold War armor in an era of precision weapons, drones, and industrial attrition. [S1] [S2] Sources
Design influence: the T-62 itself did not define the next Soviet MBT generation as strongly as the T-64/T-72 line, but it normalized the smoothbore-gun path that became central to later Soviet and Russian tank design. Its limitations also emphasized why autoloaders, better armor arrays, improved sights, and more powerful engines became priorities. Sources
Doctrinal influence: post-Cold-War T-62 usage shows that obsolete tanks can still be tactically relevant if assigned to lower-risk roles, prepared positions, direct-fire support, deception, training, or armored logistics. Conversely, it shows the danger of using legacy tanks as if they were modern MBTs against modern reconnaissance-strike systems. Sources
Surviving vehicles: numerous T-62s survive in museums and military collections, including ex-Iraqi examples at The Tank Museum/Bovington and restored or park-display T-62M/MV vehicles in Russia and elsewhere. Post-service paint, missing equipment, and museum display arrangements can complicate identification of a vehicle's former service configuration. [S1] [IMG4] [IMG5] Sources
Modern reputation: the T-62 has become a shorthand for Russian armored attrition in Ukraine, but this shorthand can obscure the more interesting story. The tank is obsolete, yet its return also proves that decades-old industrial decisions can shape modern wars. A hull built for early-1960s doctrine can still affect twenty-first-century logistics, propaganda, repair capacity, and battlefield improvisation. Sources
The strongest sources for the 2022+ reactivation are official government statements and visually documented OSINT, but these do not provide a full technical manual. Russian state-media sources are useful because they identify repair plants and describe claimed modernization packages; they are described as claims rather than neutral verification. [S1] [S2] [S3] [S5] [S6] [S9] [S10] Sources
The best-established points are: the T-62 was a Soviet smoothbore-gun tank family produced in very large numbers; T-62M and T-62MV were late-Soviet upgrades; T-62M/MV vehicles reappeared in Ukraine; Syria received T-62M/T-62MV-related deliveries from Russia; and Oryx loss lists are photo/video-confirmed rather than total-loss estimates. [S1] [S2] [S3] [S5] [S6] [S7] [S8] Sources
Less certain details include: exact T-62M conversion quantities, exact ammunition capacities by subvariant, exact operator readiness, and some details of 2022+ batches. These are plausible and often repeated, but they can vary by source or by vehicle. [S2] [S3] Sources
Unconfirmed details include: all-vehicle application of exhibition modernization packages, exact 780 hp engine standardization, universal retention of Sheksna capability after sight refits, and precise numbers of Algerian Berezhok conversions. These details remain unconfirmed in the cited evidence. [S9] [S10] [S14] [S15] Sources
Photographs and image credits
Background reading and references. Each photograph has its own source and credit.
Sources and further reading
Background reading and references. Each photograph has its own source and credit.
- [S1] — The Tank Museum — T-62.
- [S2] — Tank Encyclopedia — T-62 / Object 166.
- [S3] — WeaponSystems.net — T-62M.
- [S5] — UK Government / OSCE statement — Wagner Group continues to recruit prisoners to fight in Ukraine.
- [S6] — Oryx — Visual-loss methodology and first documented losses of T-62M/MV obr. 2022 labels
- [S6] — Oryx — Visual-loss methodology and first documented losses of T-62M/MV obr. 2022 labels
- [S7] — Oryx — Replenishing the Stocks: Russian deliveries of T-62Ms and BMP-1s reach Syria.
- [S8] — Oryx — Rearming Syria: Russian deliveries of T-62MVs, BRM-1Ks and BMP-1s.
- [S9] — TASS — Возвращение к строю: что известно о модернизированном танке Т-62М.
- [S10] — Rossiyskaya Gazeta — Модернизированные Т-62 получат защиту от Javelin и тепловизоры.
- [S11] — The War Zone — Russia To Modernize 800 Vintage T-62 Tanks Due To Ukraine Losses: Report.
- [S12] — The War Zone — Russian Tanks Reverting To Cold War Thermal Sights As Losses Mount.
- [S14] — Tank Encyclopedia — T-62 in Algerian Service and T-62 Berezhok.
- [S15] — Janes — Algeria rolls out more T-62 conversions.
- [IMG1] — Wikimedia Commons / Davric — Public-domain image of Afghan National Army T-62M/BTS-4 context, Kabul, 2004
- [IMG2] — Wikimedia Commons / SPC Kelly Matthew Burkhart, U.S. Army — File:T-62s and T-62Ms Afghanistan.JPEG.
- [IMG3] — Wikimedia Commons / Vitaly V. Kuzmin — CC BY-SA 4.0 photograph of T-62MV at Patriot Park, 2016
- [IMG4] — Wikimedia Commons / Vitaly V. Kuzmin — CC BY-SA 4.0 photograph of T-62 model 1972, 2016
- [IMG5] — Wikimedia Commons / Makizox — CC BY-SA 4.0 photograph of ex-Iraqi T-62 at Bovington/The Tank Museum, 2017
- [IMG6] — Wikimedia Commons / Vitaly V. Kuzmin — CC BY-SA 4.0 close-up of T-62M turret and armor details, 2016